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court is unfounded. The Article also comments on the court’s order severing a portion of a legislatively proposed amendment and
argues that this action exceeded the court’s authority and infringed
upon the separation of powers doctrine. The Article concludes by
examining the Bess decision as applied to possible subsistence
amendments and by proposing alternatives to the Bess standard
for distinguishing between amendments and revisions.

I. INTRODUCTION
1
The 1999 Alaska Supreme Court decision Bess v. Ulmer articulated, for the first time in Alaska, the difference between a constitutional revision and a constitutional amendment. Like most
state constitutions in the United States, Alaska’s provides two
methods of change—one for amendments and one for revisions.
The Bess case was a unique opportunity for the court to create a
workable and predictable standard establishing the scope of Alaskans’ power to amend their constitution through the legislative
process and subsequent popular ratification. After an extensive
review of Alaska’s constitutional history, out-of-state constitutional
jurisprudence, and scholarly discussion, the court adopted a socalled “hybrid” test that set out quantitative and qualitative limits
2
for a constitutional amendment. In doing so, the court cast a
shadow of confusion and uncertainty over the constitutional horizon—bewildering Alaskans and mystifying the legislature. By establishing narrow parameters for permissible change by constitutional amendment, the court has effectively precluded the
legislature from placing most, if not all, of the recently proposed
subsistence amendments on the ballot.
II. THE BESS V. ULMER DECISION
The Bess dispute came before the court as a result of the opposition of several citizens’ groups to the placement on the ballot
of three controversial propositions to amend the Alaska Constitu3
tion. Legislative Resolve No. 59 would have limited the rights of
4
Alaska prisoners to those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
1. 985 P.2d 979 (Alaska 1999).
2. See generally id.
3. Id. at 981.
4. Leg. Res. 59, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1998). The proposal read:
Rights of Prisoners. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this constitution, the rights and protections, and the extent of those rights and protections, afforded by this constitution to prisoners convicted of crimes
shall be limited to those rights and protections, and the extent of those
rights and protections, afforded under the Constitution of the United
States to prisoners convicted of crimes.
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Legislative Resolve No. 71 limited the constitutional definition of
marriage to one man and one woman.5 Finally, Legislative Resolve
No. 74 removed from the executive the power to redistrict, and
6
gave that power instead to an independent body. The citizens’
groups challenged the measures, arguing that “the propositions
were revisions not amendments; revisions can only be accom7
plished through a constitutional convention.”
There are two paths to constitutional change in Alaska:
8
amendment and revision. An amendatory change may be pro9
posed by a two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature. The
Lieutenant Governor is then charged with preparing a summary of
the amendments and placing them on the ballot in the next general
10
If approved by the majority of the electorate, the
election.
11
amendment is adopted. An amendment may also be enacted
12
through a constitutional convention. A revision, by contrast, may
be enacted only by constitutional convention. This limitation is inferred from the language of article XIII. Section 1 authorizes the
legislature to propose amendments, while section 4 provides that a
constitutional convention has “plenary power to amend or revise
13
the constitution, subject only to ratification by the people.” The
citizens’ groups in Bess argued that article XIII’s use of “amend” to
describe the legislature’s power, and “amend or revise” to describe
a convention’s power reflected a substantive distinction and meant
14
that the legislature cannot propose revisions.

5. Leg. Res. 71, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1998). The proposal read:
Marriage. To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist
only between one man and one woman. No provision of this constitution
may be interpreted to require the State to recognize or permit marriage
between individuals of the same sex.
6. Leg. Res. 74, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1998).
7. Bess, 985 P.2d at 981.
8. ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1-4.
9. Id. § 1.
10. Id. At the time of the Bess litigation, Fran Ulmer was the Lieutenant
Governor. Accordingly, her name appears in the caption of the case, as the case
was styled as an injunction barring her from placing the contested proposals on
the ballot.
11. Id.
12. Id. § 4 (“Constitutional conventions shall have plenary power to amend or
revise the constitution, subject only to ratification by the people. No call for a
constitutional convention shall limit these powers of the convention.”).
13. Id. §§ 1, 4.
14. Bess, 985 P.2d at 981.
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The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the
state.15 The citizens’ groups appealed, and because the election was
rapidly approaching, the supreme court reviewed the decision on
16
an expedited basis. The court issued a preliminary order, which
struck Legislative Resolve No. 59 (the prisoners’ rights measure) as
a revision, edited Legislative Resolve No. 71 (the marriage measure) and permitted the changed proposal, and permitted Legisla17
tive Resolve No. 74 (the redistricting measure). The supreme
court later issued a more comprehensive final opinion, drafted by
Justice Matthews, in which it explained the reasoning behind its
18
preliminary opinion.
As a result of the expedited appeal process, the Bess court
made its decision with inadequate briefing. The superior court’s
ruling did not address whether the prisoners’ rights amendment,
standing alone, was a revision, and the notice of appeal did not
19
raise the issue. The plaintiffs’ notice of appeal, filed with the superior court on September 4, 1998, alleged that the superior court
erred in finding the proposed marriage amendment constitutional,
and also erred in finding that the cumulative effect of all three pro20
posed amendments did not amount to a revision. The supreme
court’s expedited appeal order directed that the appeal would be
based primarily upon the briefing filed with the superior court, but
21
permitted supplemental briefing as well. Only the plaintiffs’ reply
brief to the superior court discussed whether the prisoners’ rights
22
amendment, standing alone, was a revision. The State did not
brief this issue in its supplemental brief because the notice of ap23
24
peal did not raise the issue. Plaintiffs did brief the issue, however, and the court ruled the prisoners’ rights amendment to be a

15. Id. at 982.
16. Id. at 993.
17. Id. at 994-96.
18. Id. at 981.
19. Motion for Expedited Consideration of Appeal, Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d
979 (Alaska 1999) (Nos. S-08811/8812) (on file with authors).
20. Notice of Appeal, Bess (Nos. S-08811/8812); Statement of Points on Appeal, Bess (Nos. S-08811/8812) (on file with authors).
21. Order, Bess (Nos. S-08811/8812) (on file with authors).
22. Combined Reply to Motions Filed by State of Alaska and Legislative
Council Re: Motion for Summary Judgment, Bess (Superior Court of Alaska
1988) (No. 3AN 98-7972CIV) (on file with authors).
23. Supplemental Brief of the Alaska Legislature, Bess (Nos. S-08811/8812)
(on file with authors).
24. Supplemental Memorandum, Bess (Nos. S-08811/8812) (on file with
authors).
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revision.25 Since both supplemental briefs were due on September
26
15th, 1998, the State did not have an opportunity to reply to the
plaintiffs’ discussion of this issue in its supplemental brief. Accordingly, the Bess court ruled on the constitutionality of the prisoners’ rights amendment (and, in the process, applied the new test
and set an example for other courts to follow) without the benefit
27
of adequate briefing on the subject.
The supreme court held that the Alaska Constitution did sub28
In
stantively distinguish between amendment and revision.
reaching this holding, the court relied primarily upon the Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, explaining that the
Framers “explicitly contemplated the importance of the differentiation between amendments and revisions and between their respec29
tive fields of application.” One delegate noted the significant difference between “simple” amendments to articles or sections of the
constitution and revisions “which [imply] rewriting the constitu30
tion.” The court in Bess thus attributed substantive meaning to
the inclusion of both words “amend” and “revise” in section 4 of
the constitution:
The Framers’ decision to narrow the alternatives for adopting
revisions by making constitutional conventions the sole permissible procedure demonstrates not only their awareness of the
distinction between revisions and amendments, but also their desire to give the distinction substance, thereby ensuring that it
31
would be observed by future generations of Alaskans.

The court developed three policy rationales supporting a vigorous distinction between amendments and revisions. First, the
court explained that limiting the amount of constitutional change

25. Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979, 987-88 (Alaska 1999).
26. Order, Bess (Nos. S-08811/8812) (on file with authors).
27. Note that this was contrary to the court’s usual practice of not ruling on an
issue that has not been adequately briefed by the parties. See, e.g., A.H. v. W.P.,
896 P.2d 240, 243 (Alaska 1995) (holding that where “a point is given only cursory
statement in the argument portion of a brief, the point will not be considered on
appeal”) (citation omitted). Moreover, it was an unwise practice and inconsistent
with that of most other courts. Other courts tend to believe that an issue is fully
explored only when adversarial parties have fully presented their opposing viewpoints, and that such briefing greatly enhances a court’s ability to reach a correct
judgment. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 558
(1994).
28. Bess, 985 P.2d at 982.
29. Id.
30. 2 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention 1247 (Jan. 5,
1956).
31. Bess, 985 P.2d at 983.
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protected the stability of Alaska’s constitutional regime.32 Second,
the court hoped that constitutional conventions would somehow be
better equipped than legislatures to consider constitutional
33
changes. Finally, the court expressed concern about logrolling
and bundling, reasoning that multifarious amendments might “aggregate[] for the measure the favorable votes from electors of
many suasions who, wanting strongly enough any one or more
propositions offered, might grasp at that which they want, tacitly
34
accepting the remainder.”
The court concluded that the Framers intended a substantive
distinction, but that they did not supply a particularly clear defini35
tion of the concepts of “amendment” and “revision.” Accordingly,
the court looked to scholarly works on the subject, primarily a trea36
tise by Judge John A. Jameson. In particular, the court adopted
Jameson’s language defining amendments as changes that are “few,
37
simple, independent, and of comparatively small importance.”
The court also adopted Jameson’s declaration that a constitutional
convention is required for “a general revision of [the] Constitution,
or even for single propositions involving radical changes as to the
policy of which the popular mind has not been informed by prior
38
discussions.”
The court supplemented its scholarly research with reference
to the jurisprudence of other states. In particular, the court relied
heavily on California cases applying the distinction between
39
amendment and revision, noting that California had collected
40
over one hundred years of jurisprudence on the question. Accordingly, the court adopted California’s qualitative/quantitative
41
analysis developed in four main cases: Amador Valley Joint Union
42
High School District v. State Board of Equalization, Brosnahan v.
32. Id. (“One purpose of requiring a constitutional convention for revisions of
the constitution is to promote stability.”).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 985 (quoting McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 797 (Cal. 1948)).
35. Id. at 982.
36. Id. at 983-84, 987. The court alluded to other scholars’ works and cited
from WALTER F. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 261-62 (1910), but Chief Justice Matthews relied primarily on
JOHN A. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR
HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING §§ 540, 574(c) (4th ed. 1887).
37. Bess, 985 P.2d at 983, 987 (quoting JAMESON, supra note 36, § 540).
38. Id. at 983 (quoting JAMESON, supra note 36, § 547(c)).
39. Id. at 984-87.
40. Id. at 984.
41. Id. at 987.
42. 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978).
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Brown,43 Raven v. Deukmejian,44 and Legislature of the State of
45
California v. Eu. The California test finds that a proposal is a
quantitative revision if it proposes to add numerous sections to the
constitution or to delete existing language such that it alters the
46
“substantial entirety” of the document. A proposal is a qualitative revision, on the other hand, if it substantially alters the basic
47
governmental plan.
Drawing from Judge Jameson’s writings and the California
cases, the court in Bess outlined the distinction between an
amendment and a revision. Basically, the court’s rule is that
“changes which are few, simple, independent, and of comparatively
small importance” can be considered an amendment, whereas
sweeping changes are a revision for which a constitutional conven48
tion is required. The court did not, however, simply adopt California’s tests in toto. Rather, the court crafted a “hybrid” test that
appears to involve a sliding scale relating the qualitative and quan49
titative elements to one another. This so-called “hybrid” test requires consideration of both the qualitative and quantitative impact
of a proposed constitutional change in determining whether it is an
50
amendment or a revision. A partial showing on one test can, evi51
dently, reduce the showing required on the other test.
Having articulated a framework for distinguishing between
amendments and revisions, the Bess court went on to apply its test
to the three proposals in question. The court held that Legislative
Resolve No. 59 (the prisoners’ rights measure) was a revision and
52
Although this
thus could not be proposed by the legislature.
measure was very similar to the California measure discussed in
Raven v. Deukmejian, the Alaska court distinguished its own analysis by finding that the measure was both a qualitative and a quanti53
tative revision. The court noted that even though the measure on
its face proposed to add only one sentence to the constitutional

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982).
801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991).
Bess, 985 P.2d at 986-87.
Id.
Id. at 983, 987 (quoting JAMESON, supra note 36, § 540).
Id. at 987; see also id. at 989-90 (Compton, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 987-88; see also id. at 989-90 (Compton, J., dissenting in part).
See id. at 988.
Id. at 987-88.
Id.
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text, it had the potential to affect eleven separate sections of the
constitution.54
The court edited Legislative Resolve No. 71 (the marriage
measure) by deleting the second sentence of the proposal and then
found that, as edited, it was “sufficiently limited in both quantity
55
and effect of change.” Finally, the court held that Legislative Resolve No. 74 (the redistricting measure) was an amendment and
56
appropriate for proposal by the legislature. The court held this
despite the fact that No. 74 changed the structure of Alaskan government by transferring apportionment power from the Executive
57
branch to a redistricting board.
Justice Compton dissented, disagreeing not so much with the
58
court’s result as with its reasoning. He noted that the court was
59
unclear about what test it was adopting. Although the majority
repeatedly made reference to the “hybrid” test, they did not define
60
Justice
it or clearly differentiate it from the California test.
Compton noted that the California analysis involved two separate
tests, while the Bess court’s analysis of Legislative Resolve No. 74
seemed to advocate what sounded “suspiciously like a sliding comparative scale test,” involving the dual quantitative/qualitative as61
Justice Compton’s dissent, while
pects working in tandem.
touching on some of the major problems of the Bess test, did not
recognize the substantial distinctions between the California cases
cited and the facts before the court.
The legislature’s response to the Bess decision was unambiguously negative. The Senate Judiciary Committee adopted and sent
a letter to the Alaska Supreme Court expressing great concern
about several aspects of Bess: the rewriting of the proposed marriage amendment; the lack of adequate briefing on the independent

54. Id.
55. Id. at 988.
56. Id. at 988-89.
57. Id. at 995 (Preliminary Opinion and Order).
58. Id. at 989-92 (Compton, J., dissenting in part). Justice Compton would
have found Legislative Resolve No. 74 (the reapportionment measure) a constitutional revision because it redistributed foundational powers formerly held by the
chief executive alone to various other branches of government. Id. at 992
(Compton, J., dissenting in part). He cited Wade v. Nolan, 414 P.2d 689, 694-95
(Alaska 1966), in support of the uniqueness of Alaska’s apportionment scheme
and its central role in the Framers’ vision of the basic structure of government.
Bess, 985 P.2d at 991 (Compton, J., dissenting in part).
59. Bess, 985 P.2d at 989 (Compton, J., dissenting in part).
60. Id. at 989-90 (Compton, J., dissenting in part).
61. Id. at 989-92 (Compton, J., dissenting in part).
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constitutionality of the proposed prisoners’ rights amendment and
the proposed redistricting amendment; and the ambiguity of the
62
Bess rule. The legislature even attempted to resolve the problems
created by Bess by proposing an amendment adopting a single
subject rule for distinguishing between amendments and revisions
63
to the constitution. It is, of course, an open question whether such
a proposal would pass the Bess test. Likewise, it is far from clear
that Bess would permit an amendment giving the legislature the
power to propose revisions. The remainder of this Article will explain some of the most salient criticisms of the Bess opinion.
III. THE BESS COURT LACKED THE AUTHORITY TO REWRITE
A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
The Bess court changed the text of the proposed marriage
amendment before passing it on to the voters for ratification. Before Bess, the marriage measure contained two sentences: “To be
valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between
one man and one woman. No provision of this constitution may be
interpreted to require the State to recognize or permit marriage be64
tween individuals of the same sex.” The Bess court found that the
first sentence was clearly only an amendment, but was concerned
that the second sentence either had a very broad sweep changing
many constitutional provisions, or simply repeated the first sen65
tence and thus was surplusage. Since the court believed that surplus language should never be added to the constitution, it ordered
the deletion of the second sentence before placing Legislative Re66
solve No. 71 on the ballot.
Regardless of whether the remainder of the Bess court’s legal
reasoning is persuasive or not, it is beyond question that the court
exceeded its authority when it rewrote the proposed marriage
amendment and passed the new, judicially proposed amendment
on to the voters. The Alaska Constitution specifically authorizes
only two entities to propose constitutional amendments—the leg67
islature and a constitutional convention. Neither of those entities
62. Letter from the Senate Judiciary Committee to Alaska Supreme Court
Justices (Apr. 20, 2000) (on file with authors).
63. Leg. Res. 47, 21st Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2000). This was Ballot Measure
No. 2 in the 2000 General Elections. It received 46% of the vote and, therefore,
did not pass.
64. Leg. Res. 71, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1998).
65. Bess, 985 P.2d at 988 n.57; see also id. at 995-96 (Preliminary Opinion and
Order).
66. Id.
67. ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1, 4.
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proposed the marriage amendment on which the Alaska electorate
eventually voted. That amendment was proposed by the Supreme
Court of the State of Alaska, a body not authorized to do so by the
constitution. Section A of this Part will argue that by assuming the
power to change proposed amendments (and thereby to propose
new ones), the court departed from the procedure spelled out in
the Alaska constitution, while Section B will argue that the court
also wrought an erosion of the separation of powers. Section C will
argue that the court’s purported justification for this action was insufficient.
A. Judicial Alteration of a Proposed Constitutional Amendment
Plainly Violates the Alaska Constitution
As the court declared in Bess, the procedures for amending or
68
revising the state constitution must be strictly adhered to. Those
provisions are quite clear. Article XIII, section 1 of the Alaska
Constitution provides that amendments “may be proposed by a
69
two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature.” Amendments
70
can then be adopted by a majority vote of the electorate. Article
XIII, section 4 of the Alaska Constitution provides that
“[c]onstitutional conventions shall have the plenary power to
71
amend or revise the constitution.” Neither section 2 nor section 3
provides any authority for the judiciary to propose amendments or
to change amendments proposed by the legislature. The Alaska
Supreme Court has recognized this principle in the context of
statutory lawmaking, holding that “[t]he state Constitution invests
the power to enact laws in the legislature and the people, but not
the courts. Alaska courts are obligated to avoid interfering with
72
the lawmaking process any more than is necessary.”
When the court changes the wording of a proposed amendment, it changes the meaning of the amendment. By doing so, the
court assumes the role of essentially proposing a new amendment,
thereby usurping the legislature’s exclusive constitutional power.
The procedure articulated by the constitution is clear and precise:
the legislature proposes a change, and the people vote yea or nay.
The Bess court added a judicial revision step not contemplated by

68. Id. at 982; see also State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 639 (Alaska 1977).
69. ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
70. Id.
71. Id. § 4.
72. McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 94 (Alaska 1988) (citations
omitted).
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the constitution. That is inconsistent with strict adherence to the
constitutional procedure.
Ironically, California courts (the same courts upon which the
Bess court relied so heavily) invalidate entire initiatives, rather
73
than invalidating portions of initiatives, reasoning that “the whole
theory of initiative legislation [is] based upon the security that the
legislation proposed and petitioned for by the people shall be voted
upon at the polls by them without interference, revision, or mutila74
tion by any official or set of officials[.]” Not only was the Bess
court’s action a violation of the plain text of the Alaska constitution, it also compromised, as Section B will argue, the separation of
powers principles underlying that text.
B. Judicial Alteration of a Proposed Constitutional Amendment
Erodes the Separation of Powers
Like the U.S. Constitution, the Alaska Constitution is built
upon a separation of powers. “Under the structure envisaged by
Alaska’s fundamental charter, the legislative power of the state is
vested in the legislature, the executive power in the governor, and
the judicial power in a supreme court, a superior court and such
75
additional courts as established by the legislature.” The Framers
of the Alaska Constitution recognized the traditional framework of
the federal government’s doctrine of separation of powers and in76
corporated it into the Alaska Constitution. Implementing and
abiding by “the separation of powers doctrine requires that the
blending of governmental powers will not be inferred in the ab77
sence of an express constitutional provision.”

73. See Bennett v. Drullard, 149 P.2d 368, 370 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1915).
74. Id.
75. Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1, 6 (Alaska 1976) (citing ALASKA CONST.
art. II, § 1; art. III, § 1; art. IV, § 1) (footnotes omitted).
76. The Alaska Supreme Court has said that
“[t]he governmental authority of the State of Alaska was distributed
among the three branches, the executive, the legislative and the judicial.”
Analyzing this tripartite form of government provided for Alaska, this
court concluded that “. . . it can fairly be implied that this state does recognize the separation of powers doctrine.” Our recent opinion in Continental Insurance Cos. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., acknowledges that the
underlying rationale of the doctrine of separation of powers is the avoidance of tyrannical aggrandizement of power by a single branch of government through the mechanism of diffusion of governmental powers.
Id. at 5 (citations and footnotes omitted).
77. Id. at 7 (citing Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447, 450 (Alaska 1963); State v.
Campbell, 536 P.2d 105, 110-11 (Alaska 1975)).
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Yet blend the Bess court did. The constitution allocates to the
legislature the power to draft amendments, the people the power to
approve or reject them, and the court the power to interpret and
apply them. The Bess court undertook a remarkable power grab
when it arrogated to itself not just the power to interpret constitutional amendments, but also the power to manipulate the language
of the amendments it will later interpret.
78
In McAlpine v. University of Alaska, the court expressly acknowledged that severing preelection ballot provisions raises a
79
very real separation of powers issue. McAlpine involved a state
university’s challenge to the lieutenant governor’s certification of
an initiative that would establish a separate community college system within state government and require the university to transfer
80
property to the new system. Recognizing that the severance issue
“involves separation of powers considerations” because the “constitution invests the power to enact laws in the legislature and the
81
people, but not in the courts,” the court held that
the duty of a court in conducting a preelection review of an initiative is similar to the court’s duty when reviewing an enacted
law. In particular, when the requisite number of voters have already subscribed to an initiative, a reviewing court should sever
an impermissible portion of the proposed bill when the following
conditions are met: (1) standing alone, the remainder of the proposed bill can be given legal effect; (2) deleting the impermissible portion would not substantially change the spirit of the
measure; and (3) it is evident from the content of the measure
and the circumstances surrounding its proposal that the sponsors
and subscribers would prefer the measure to stand as altered,
82
rather than to be invalidated in its entirety.

Notably, the court derives its authority to sever from a statute.
Generally, courts can sever statutes that expressly contain a severability clause. Alaska courts have also determined that, because of
Alaska’s general savings clause, they can sever statutes enacted by
83
the legislature without such clauses. The general savings clause
states that
[a]ny law heretofore or hereafter enacted by the Alaska legislature which lacks a severability clause shall be construed as
though it contained the clause in the following language: “If any
provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988).
Id. at 94.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 94-95 (citations omitted).
Lynden Transport v. State, 532 P.2d 700, 713-15 (Alaska 1975).
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circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act and the
application to other
persons or circumstances shall not be af84
fected thereby.”

The general savings clause allowed the court to determine that an
otherwise constitutionally permissible portion of a statute can be
severed only if the statute standing alone can be given legal effect
and that the legislature intended the provision to stand if other
85
provisions were struck by a court. The McAlpine court agreed
that the severance power is a creature of statute, stating:
[w]e have alluded to but not examined the contours of the doctrine of severability as mandated by separation of powers under
the state Constitution. This court’s decisions in recent severability cases were controlled by AS 01.10.030, the general savings
statute for legislatively-enacted
laws, rather than directly by con86
cerns of separation of powers.

Since the constitution is Alaska’s highest law, to be strictly adhered
to, no severability statute can grant the court powers that the constitution has withheld. Accordingly, while the court may have the
power to edit legislation proposed by popular initiative before it is
voted on, it does not have the power to so edit proposed constitutional amendments.
McAlpine and related cases dealt with popularly proposed
87
statutory law. A proposal to amend the Alaska Constitution begins as a resolve in the legislature, and presents an even stronger
case for judicial restraint. Given the greater significance of a constitutional amendment, the separation of powers concerns should
be of considerably greater force.
84. ALASKA STAT. § 01-10-030 (Michie 2000).
85. Lynden Transport, 532 P.2d at 713-15.
86. McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 94 n.24 (citations omitted). Indeed, “[t]he separation of powers doctrine prohibits us [the court] from enacting legislation or redrafting patently defective statutes.” Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1238
(Alaska 1979) (citing State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105, 111 (Alaska 1975), overruled by Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1978)); Gottschalk v. State, 575
P.2d 289, 296 (Alaska 1978)). Similarly, in Campbell, the court stated:
[t]his court is admittedly under a duty to reconcile, whenever possible,
challenged legislation with the constitution by rendering a construction
that would harmonize the statutory language with specific constitutional
provisions. However, in fulfilling that duty, the extent to which the express language of the provision can be altered and departed from and
the extent to which the infirmities can be rectified by the use of implied
terms is limited by the constitutionally decreed separation of powers
which prohibits this court from enacting legislation or redrafting defective statutes.
536 P.2d at 110-11 (footnotes omitted).
87. See McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 82.
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In decisions before Bess, the court had conceded its lack of
power to rewrite legislation. In State v. Campbell,88 the court was
89
faced with a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute. Noting
that the role of the court was to reconcile, whenever possible, the
statute with the constitution by rendering a construction that harmonizes statutory language with constitutional provisions, it nonetheless recognized that its power to interpret the statute was lim90
ited by the separation of powers doctrine. Since the doctrine
limits the ability of the court to imply terms in a statute, it certainly
prohibits the court from engaging in the wholesale rewriting of a
legislatively proposed constitutional amendment.
The court’s role in reviewing constitutional amendments and
the process by which they were adopted is a significant check on
the people of Alaska and their legislature’s ability to propose
amendments to the constitution. The separation of the power to
propose amendments from the power to review and apply them
creates a system of checks and balances on the process of amending
the constitution. When the judiciary rewrites proposed amendments, it impermissibly alters this system of checks and balances
because the branch of government drafting proposed amendments
becomes the branch that will also review the proposals for constitutionality and apply the amendments to specific cases.
This is, to the best of the authors’ awareness, the only case in
which an American court has ever altered the text of a legislatively
proposed constitutional amendment and then placed it on the ballot. To take such a radical new step, and arrogate to itself such
authority, the court would need a compelling justification. The justification actually offered in Bess, however, was far from sufficient.
C. The Bess Court’s Justification Was Insufficient
The only justification for this action given by the court was the
allegation that counsel representing the legislature stipulated to the
modification of the amendment. The court claimed that “[a]t oral
argument the appellees acknowledged that this court has the power
91
to order the deletion of the second sentence.” This justification is
insufficient for two reasons.

88. 536 P.2d 105 (Alaska 1975), overruled by Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25
(Alaska 1978).
89. Id. at 106.
90. Id. at 110-11; see also Veco Int’l, Inc. v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n, 753
P.2d 703, 713 (Alaska 1988); Kimoktoak, 584 P.2d at 31 n.6.
91. Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979, 995 (Alaska 1999).
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First, no attorney or party can waive the specific language of
the constitution or the doctrine of separation of powers. Other jurisdictions recognize and vigorously enforce this principle. For example, it is well settled law in the federal courts that no stipulation—either by an attorney or by one of the parties themselves—
can create federal subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., vest the court
with the power to hear a case) where Congress has not conferred
92
it. A similar principle applies here. No stipulation—either by an
attorney or by one of the parties—can vest the court with the
power to change an amendment before placing it in front of the
Alaska electorate. Only the constitution itself can do that.
Second, even if the legislature somehow could authorize the
court to change a proposed amendment, the purported concession
was allegedly extracted from the legislature’s counsel at oral argu93
ment, and, therefore, counsel had no opportunity to consult the
legislature, his client. Accordingly, the purported concession could
not be construed as a legislative authorization to depart from the
constitutionally mandated procedure.
The court should not have violated the separation of powers
doctrine based on an attorney’s stipulation. It is beyond debate
that the specific language of a proposed amendment can be approved only by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the legislature.
The so-called Marriage Amendment that ultimately passed was not
proposed by the legislature in the manner required by the constitution, but rather was proposed by the court. The constitution does
not allow attorneys or the court to modify proposed constitutional
amendments.
***
The portion of Bess v. Ulmer holding that the court may
change the text of a legislatively proposed constitutional amendment before passing it on to the voters is, beyond question, indefensible. As to this issue, Bess clearly violates the plain text of the
Alaska Constitution. Moreover, the Bess doctrine aggregates too
much power in the hands of the judiciary, substantially eroding the
separation of powers in Alaska. Regardless of the merits or demerits of the remainder of the Bess decision, as discussed in the
remainder of this Article, the court should take the earliest opportunity to disavow this portion of Bess.
92. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293
U.S. 237, 244 (1934); Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111
U.S. 379, 382 (1884).
93. Bess, 985 P.2d at 995 (“At oral argument the appellees acknowledged that
this court has the power to order the deletion of the second sentence . . . .”).
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IV. THE ERRORS OF THE BESS TEST
The Bess court went too far in attempting to give teeth to the
distinction between amendment and revision. While the constitution clearly uses both terms, and the minutes of the constitutional
convention reveal that the Framers plainly intended the two terms
to mean different things, there is no warrant for the aggressive
move in Bess to broaden the “revision” category and narrow the
“amendment” category. By doing so, the Bess court froze the
Alaska Constitution in its current form. Under Bess, the vast majority of changes that could allow the Alaska Constitution to live
and grow with the needs of the Alaska people can be made only by
constitutional convention.
The Bess court undertook this freezing of the Alaska Constitution based on extremely suspect legal grounds. Section A of this
Part will argue that the Bess court’s reliance on California cases
was unwarranted. Section B will argue that, not only was the
precedential support for Bess dubious at best, but also the policy
rationales articulated in the Bess decision do not support the test
ultimately adopted. Finally, Section C will argue that the Bess test
is subjective and confusing, providing inadequate guidance to the
legislature and future courts.
A. Bess’s Reliance on the California Cases Was Inappropriate
The Bess court lifted its two-part test from a series of Califor94
nia cases. California, however, allows its legislature to propose
both amendments and revisions—only the citizens’ initiative proc95
ess in California is limited to amendments. The California cases
thus distinguish between amendment and revision in an attempt to
set rules for the otherwise freewheeling initiative process, not in an
attempt to curtail the constitutionally delegated powers of a democratically elected legislature. Accordingly, the California courts
had considerable latitude, since limiting the initiative process did
not limit Californians to the choices of virtually no constitutional
change or an unpredictable and even dangerous constitutional convention. The middle ground of legislative revision has always remained open in California. The Bess court, however, transplanted
those tests to Alaska, without proper appreciation for their context.
The Alaska legislature, therefore, is now hobbled by a test designed to constrain the unreflective and often rash initiative process, while the people of Alaska have no method short of a constitu-

94. See cases cited supra notes 42-45.
95. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 3.
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tional convention to accomplish meaningful changes to their constitution.
The California Constitution currently allows constitutional
change by four methods: (1) amendment proposed by a two-thirds
vote of each house of the legislature; (2) revision proposed by a
two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature; (3) revision proposed by constitutional convention; and (4) amendment proposed
96
by citizen initiative. In all four cases, the proposed changes must
97
be ratified by a majority vote of the people of California. It is the
interpretation of the fourth method of constitutional change—the
citizens’
initiative—from
which
emerged
the
qualitative/quantitative test partially adopted by the Bess court.
The citizens’ direct power to amend the constitution was born
of the 1911 reform movement headed by Governor Hiram John98
son. The monied elites and the Southern Pacific Railroad Com99
pany had a vice-like grip on state politics. The progressive Republican reformers viewed direct democracy as the answer to
curbing corporate control of the legislative process and returning
100
the power of government to the people. The reformers did not,
however, view the citizens’ power to effect constitutional change as
unlimited. An important distinction was made between the citi96. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII provides:
§ 1. The Legislature by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of
the membership of each house concurring, may propose an amendment
or revision of the Constitution and in the same manner may amend or
withdraw its proposal. Each amendment shall be so prepared and submitted that it can be voted on separately.
§ 2. The Legislature by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of
the membership of each house concurring, may submit at a general election the question whether to call a convention to revise the Constitution.
If the majority vote yes on that question, within 6 months the Legislature
shall provide for the convention. Delegates to a constitutional convention shall be voters elected from districts as nearly equal in population as
may be practicable.
§ 3. The electors may amend the Constitution by initiative.
§ 4. A proposed amendment or revision shall be submitted to the electors and if approved by a majority of votes thereon takes effect the day
after the election unless the measure provides otherwise. If provisions of
2 or more measures approved at the same election conflict, those of the
measure receiving the highest affirmative vote shall prevail.
97. Id. § 4.
98. See Gerald F. Uelman, Handling Hot Potatoes: Judicial Review of California Initiatives After Senate v. Jones, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999, 1011 (2001).
99. See Julia Anne Guizan, Is the California Civil Rights Initiative A Wolf in
Sheep’s Clothing?: Distinguishing Constitutional Amendments from Revision in
California’s Initiative Process, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 261 (1997).
100. See id.
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zens’ power to amend and a constitutional convention’s sole power
to revise the constitution.101
The California Constitution was again amended in 1962 to give
102
the legislature the power to propose revisions. The amendment
was founded on the belief that the legislature could provide the
same necessarily open, reflective, and careful forum for constitu103
The legislature’s
tional change as a constitutional convention.
new power “expanded the available mechanisms to initiate reform
104
while preserving the need for careful deliberation.”
After the legislature acquired revision powers, any limitation
or definition of the term “amendment” necessarily concerned the
power of the people to effect constitutional change by initiative—
not the power of a representative democracy to enact well-drafted,
carefully debated constitutional reforms. The bulk of the jurisprudence developing the quantitative/qualitative test was decided after
1962. All post-1962 California cases cited by the Bess court dealt
with challenges to citizens’ initiatives.
The California court first differentiated between amendment
105
and revision in Livermore v. Waite, an 1894 case challenging a
legislative proposal to amend the constitution to change the state
106
In finding the impugned
capital from Sacramento to San Jose.
measure a revision, the court broadly described an amendment as
implying “such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out
107
the purpose for which it was framed.” Any change beyond that
was a revision.
101. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 2-3. Further evidence of the deliberate
and important distinction between amendment and revision can be derived from
the fact that Hiram Johnson was assistant counsel in Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424
(Cal. 1894). He argued that the legislatively proposed measure to change the capital was in fact a revision of the constitution and beyond the normal amendatory
powers of the legislature. The court agreed with him and struck the measure. See
Uelman, supra note 98, at 1011-12.
102. The constitutional amendment to allow the legislature to propose constitutional revisions was put forth by the 1962 Constitutional Revision Commission
charged with paring down the constitution’s unmanageable length and complexity.
See Uelman, supra note 98, at 1012-13.
103. Id. at 1013.
104. Id. at 1018.
105. 36 P. 424 (Cal. 1894).
106. Id. at 424-25. At the time, the California Constitution only permitted revision by constitutional convention. The legislature had the power to amend the
constitution but not to revise it. Citizens’ initiatives had not yet been introduced
into the California constitutional scheme.
107. Id. at 426.
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Half a century later, the court extended the same definition of
amendment to limit the scope of constitutional change allowed by
108
citizens’ initiatives. In McFadden v. Jordan, a 1948 case, the
court held that an initiative measure proposing to add a new article
consisting of 12 sections and over 21,000 words to the constitution
109
was a revision. At the time, the constitution was made up of 25
110
The
articles divided into 347 sections (and only 55,000 words).
measure in question dealt with subjects ranging from oleomarga111
rine to surface mining and was offered as a single amendment. In
applying the Livermore standards to citizens’ initiatives, the court
noted that the amendment/revision distinction was “scrupulously
preserved” in article XVIII, section 3 (Amendment by Initiative) in
112
that it expressly excluded revision by initiative. Far from being a
change “within the lines of the original instrument” allowed by the
amendment procedure, the impugned measure substantially altered
the purpose of the constitution and attained objectives “clearly be113
yond the lines of the [c]onstitution as [then] cast.” The sheer size
and multifarious subject matter of the measure were determinative
aspects of the court’s decision, as well as the measure’s attempt to
effect a blanket repeal of any conflicting sections of the constitu114
tion. The court was satisfied that the measure was indeed a revision, pointing to the fact that it would have directly repealed or
substantially amended at least fifteen of the twenty-five articles of
the constitution. While the McFadden decision did not formulate
the bifurcated quantitative/qualitative test, it laid the groundwork
for the court’s later adoption of the quantitative aspect of the eventual two-part test.
In 1978, in Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v.
115
State Board of Education, the court first expressly engaged the
quantitative/qualitative language in analyzing a citizens’ initiative
that proposed to change the property taxation scheme in the State

108. 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948).
109. Id. at 799.
110. Id. at 790.
111. Id. at 790-93, 796-97.
112. The McFadden court adopted the principle that every legislative enactment is presumed to have been passed in light of the jurisprudence of the day. Id.
at 789-90.
113. Id. at 799.
114. Id. at 788-89, 794. Section XII(7) of the measure in question read “If any
section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the constitution is in conflict with
any of the provisions of this article, such section, subsection, sentence, clause or
phrase is to the extent of such conflict hereby repealed.” Id. at 797.
115. 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978).
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of California.116 In establishing a more defined conceptual threshold for the amendment/revision distinction, the court determined
that a measure “so extensive . . . as to change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the [California] Constitution by deletion or altera117
tion of numerous existing provisions” is a quantitative revision.
A qualitative revision, by contrast, could be accomplished by a
relatively simple enactment if it achieved “far-reaching changes in
118
the nature of [California’s] basic governmental plan.” The court
upheld the initiative measure as suitable for the amendment procedure because it was less sweeping than the McFadden measure and
119
operated functionally within the narrow range of taxation. While
petitioners suggested that the measure had far-reaching effects in
that it potentially modified eight articles and thirty-seven sections
of the constitution, the court held that most of the direct changes
were confined to article XIII, which already contained thirty-three
120
separate sections dealing with taxation. It was unsurprising—and
most certainly intended—that the taxation provisions of article
XIII would be directly affected by the initiative measure. Unfortunately, the Amador court dealt unsatisfactorily with the issue of indirect modification of other articles, saying only that the potential
modifications suggested by the petitioners were founded on an er121
roneous interpretation of the new article.
The Amador court introduced qualitative assessment of a proposed measure’s impact in response to the petitioners’ suggestion
that the new article affected the loss of “home rule” and effectively
122
In dismissing
jeopardized the republican form of government.

116. Id. at 1283, 1286.
117. Id. at 1286.
118. Id.
119. Id. It should be noted that the California Constitution imposes a singlesubject requirement for citizens’ initiatives. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d) (“An
initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the
electors or have any effect.”). California courts have interpreted the singlesubject requirement expansively, demanding only that provisions of initiatives be
“reasonably germane” to the single overriding purpose or object of the measure.
Evans v. Superior Court, 8 P.2d 467, 469 (Cal. 1932).
120. Amador Valley, 583 P.2d at 1286.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 1287-89. The petitioners argued that the amendment to article
XIII endangered local government’s right to control and finance local affairs
without undue interference from the legislature by imposing constitutional limits
on property taxation rates and assessments. The contention that the measure altered the republican form of government was founded on section 4 of the amendment, which required any “special taxes” to be approved by a super-majority of
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the “home rule” challenge as unfounded, the court placed particular emphasis on the fact that the measure neither destroyed nor
123
The local agencies retained the
annulled any taxation powers.
same statutory and constitutional powers as before—they were
124
merely subject to new limits. The court refused to acknowledge
or consider that the local agencies’ autonomy and control over finances may be indirectly compromised through reduction in property tax revenues and new procedural limits on the ability to enact
125
special taxes.
The court dismissed the claim that the measure would amount
126
to a loss of the republican form of government. The measure did
nothing to derogate from local or state governments’ function as
127
It merely placed limits on those
elected representative bodies.
governments’ abilities to increase taxes without voter approval.
The fact that voting requirements in financial matters were not unprecedented in California’s legislative history was a significant
128
element in the analysis.
Amador’s qualitative/quantitative reasoning was echoed by
129
later courts, most notably in Brosnahan v. Brown, Raven v.
130
131
Deukmejian, and Legislature of the State of California v. Eu .
The Brosnahan court, however, added an additional refinement.
Importing language from Amador, the court resolved that any fatal
violation of the quantitative/qualitative test must “necessarily and
132
inevitably” appear from the face of the challenged measure. The
court found that the proposed “Victim’s Bill of Rights” measure
did not violate the quantitative limits on the amendment procedure
because on its face it repealed only one section and added another—indicating that the court’s test contemplates only assess-

the qualified electors in the region. The petitioners suggested that this referendum requirement amounted to a shift from representative to direct democracy.
123. Id. at 1287.
124. Id. at 1288.
125. See id. at 1287-88.
126. Id. at 1288.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1289. The court noted that prior to the enactment of article XIII §
A, the California Constitution required ratification by a super-majority of qualified electors to incur a deficit in any fiscal year.
129. 651 P.2d 274, 288 (Cal. 1982).
130. 801 P.2d 1077, 1085-86 (Cal. 1990).
131. 816 P.2d 1309, 1316-17 (Cal. 1991).
132. Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 289.
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ment of textual changes to the constitution.133 The challenged
measure did not amount to a change “so extensive . . . as to change
directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the Constitution by the deletion
134
or alteration of numerous existing provisions.” Qualitatively, the
court also found that the measure fell short of constituting “such
far-reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan
135
as to amount to a revision.” Petitioners suggested that the measure’s provisions in regard to plea bargaining and the right to safe
schools prevented the court from carrying out its constitutional
mandate to decide cases and would result in serious abridgement of
136
the people’s constitutional right to public education. In dismissing the challenges, the court refocused the quantitative/qualitative
analysis on the direct and obvious impact of a challenged measure,
rather than on speculation about the potential modifying effect of
the provision on future judicial interpretation of other sections of
the constitution. The court said:
As we have already indicated, however, petitioners’ forecast of
judicial and educational chaos is exaggerated and wholly conjectural, based primarily upon essentially unpredictable fiscal or
budgetary constraints. In Amador, we discounted similar dire
predictions that the adoption of article XIII A . . . would result in
a loss of “home rule” and the conversion of our governmental
framework from “republican” to “democratic” in form. We observed that “nothing on the face of the article” compels such results, nor confirms that the article “necessarily and inevitably”
137
will produce those feared results.

The significance of Amador’s “on its face” rule is noteworthy.
Even the California courts will strike a proposal as revisory only if
138
the revisory character of the proposal is apparent on its face.
That is California’s rule for handling the volatile citizen initiative
process. Not only did the Bess court incorporate California’s rule
and apply it to legislatively proposed amendments, Bess actually
made the rule even stricter for the legislature by inquiring beyond
the face of the amendment. Thus, even the most extreme and radical citizens’ groups in California have more power to propose

133. Id. at 288. The measure repealed article I, section 12 (right to bail), and
added article I, section 28 (dealing with victim’s rights to restitution, safe schools,
truth-in-evidence, bail, and use of prior convictions).
134. Id. (quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Board of
Education, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Cal. 1978)).
135. Id. at 288-89 (emphasis omitted).
136. Id.
137. Id. (citations omitted).
138. See, e.g., Amador Valley, 583 P.2d at 1297.
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changes to their constitution than the democratically elected legislature of Alaska has to propose changes to the Alaska constitution.
Since Brosnahan, California’s qualitative/quantitative effects
test has remained essentially unchanged. In keeping with the
court’s oft-stated mandate to jealously guard the sovereign people’s initiative power, the constitutionally entrenched initiative
right has been liberally construed, with most doubts resolved in favor of its exercise. That is not to say that the court’s application of
the test is so liberal as to emasculate any substantive distinction between amendment and revision. The qualitative effects test has
been used as a sword to strike initiatives reaching beyond the scope
139
of allowable amendments. In Raven v. Deukmejian, the court
found that a proposed measure limiting criminal defense rights to
those guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution was a qualitative revision because it vested all judicial interpretive power in relation to
140
criminal defense rights in the U.S. Supreme Court. The measure
derogated substantially from essential powers assigned by the California Constitution to a branch of government (the judiciary). In
other words, it fundamentally altered the basic governmental plan
to such an extent as to amount to a revision.
The quantitative/qualitative effects test, however, does not operate alone as the gate-keeper to the amendment/revision process
in California. As mentioned above, the California Constitution
demands that initiative measures (either statutory or constitu141
tional) embrace but one subject. If a measure violates the singlesubject rule, it cannot be placed on the ballot for ratification by the
voters. The single-subject rule has been broadly construed to mean
that the provisions of the measure must be reasonably germane to
142
Like the quantitathe overarching purpose of the initiative.
tive/qualitative effects test, the court has instructed that doubts be
143
However, the California Suresolved in favor of the initiative.
144
preme Court’s recent decision in Senate v. Jones is evidence of a
shift regarding judicial deference to initiatives. While singlesubject jurisprudence previously required a clear showing of invalidity to subject the initiative measure to pre-election review, the
Jones court lowered the threshold to a more restrictive “strong

139. 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
140. Id. at 1087.
141. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d) (“An initiative measure embracing more than
one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.”).
142. Evans v. Superior Court, 8 P.2d 467, 469 (Cal. 1932).
143. See DeVita v. County of Napa, 889 P.2d 1019, 1038 (Cal. 1995).
144. 988 P.2d 1089 (Cal. 1999).
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likelihood” of invalidity.145 The Jones case also represents the
court’s willingness to look beyond the language of the measure for
evidence of logrolling and consider the potential for voter confu146
sion or deception.
While the Jones case deals only with the single-subject test, a
more restrictive interpretation of the qualitative/quantitative effects test is sure to follow. Initiatives now dominate the political
horizon in a state where voter turnout diminishes as the length and
147
complexity of the ballot increases. Public policy debates occur in
the threatening shadow of a referendum initiated by a cowboy taxpayer deciding to “settle” the issue once and for all. As one author
wrote:
Each time Californians go to the polls, they expect to encounter
a dozen ballot propositions, to determine questions as basic as
who should go to jail, who should be executed, who should pay
taxes and how much they should pay, and who can marry whom.
Initiative contests become the political battleground where trial
lawyers shoot it out with insurance companies, prosecutors face
off against criminal defense lawyers, the religious right confronts
the gay rights movement, and environmentalists take on pollut148
ers.

Voter, lawmaker, and judicial frustration with the initiative
industry will undoubtedly result in changes in the way courts approach the distinction between amendment and revision. The
evolution of the quantitative/qualitative effects test is far from
over. Survival of the initiative system in California may depend on
a more conservative application of one of the last judicial tools for
protecting the efficiency and effectiveness of both the legislative
and voting processes.
A potential shift to a more conservative interpretation of initiative rights in California is all the more reason to distinguish the
California test from the Alaska test. As future courts look for
guidance in the application of Alaska’s “hybrid” test, they may be
convinced to adopt increasingly restrictive approaches. The people
of Alaska could be left with virtually no power to enact important
changes to their constitution short of an uncontrollable constitutional convention.
***

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 1096.
See Uelman, supra note 98, at 1008.
Id. at 1024.
Id. at 1000.
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In sum, the Bess court extracted from the California cases a
rule designed to check the excesses associated with California’s system of government by initiative. Transplanting those rules into the
context of legislatively proposed constitutional amendments was
inappropriate because the checks and procedures built into the
legislative process are already a significant insulator against rash
and hasty decisionmaking. The California cases gave no consideration to this distinction because the California legislature is given
the constitutional power to propose both amendments and revisions.
Moreover, because the California legislature is empowered to
propose revisions, the California courts can confine the scope of
acceptable amendments without paralyzing the California Constitution. Regardless of the evolution of the amendment/revision distinction in the California courts, the voters of California will be
able to effect change in their constitution without convening a constitutional convention. In Alaska, by contrast, if the definition of
“amendment” is restricted, Alaska voters will eventually be forced
into a Hobson’s choice—either live with an out-of-date constitution
that does not and cannot address important issues of the day, or
convene a constitutional convention and take the risk of completely unsettling more than a half-century of constitutional tradition.
The court should not proclaim the meaningful, substantive distinction between types and methods of constitutional change in one
breath, and then, in the next, arbitrarily ignore other important distinctions between types and methods of constitutional change when
crafting rules and doctrine. In adopting the California test without
acknowledging the vital differences between the constitutions of
California and Alaska, the Bess court imposed a standard founded
149
in a history very distinct from Alaska’s.
B. The Policy Rationales Articulated in Bess Do Not Justify the
Restrictive Bess Test
Not only is the precedential support for Bess inconsistent with
the Alaska constitutional structure, the policy concerns expressed
by the court do not warrant the restrictive test ultimately adopted.
The Bess court justified its approach by citing (1) a need for constitutional stability, (2) the theory that a constitutional convention

149. Not only did the Bess court fail to acknowledge the crucial differences between the constitutions of California and Alaska, the majority opinion actually
asserts that the two documents allow for similar methods of change. Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979, 987 (Alaska 1999).
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would be better suited than a legislature to make large changes to
the constitution, and (3) a fear of bundling and logrolling. None of
these concerns warrants the outcome in Bess.
150
The first justification offered by the Bess court was stability.
As the court explained, “[s]ome political thinkers have interpreted
the written constitution in the American political system as a stabilizing document which operates to retard change or requires a
more deliberate selection of what changes society deems desir151
able.” Essentially, the court observed that making the document
harder to change in a meaningful fashion helps provide a buffer
against hasty and unwise changes driven by popular emotion rather
than careful reflection. While this concern may make sense in the
initiative context, where proposals are debated—if at all—in the
soundbite mass media, it is much less weighty in the context of legislatively proposed changes. The legislative process itself is a brake
on hasty and ill-considered proposals, requiring debate, delibera152
tion, and compromise. Moreover, giving excessive weight to this
concern leads to a stagnant constitutional regime. By far the most
stable constitutional regime would be one that simply never
changed at all, yet such a regime would not keep up with the
changing needs of Alaska’s people. The question, therefore, is how
best to balance the need to prevent too much ill-considered change
with the need to permit sufficient adjustments to allow the Alaska
Constitution to breathe and grow. The Framers certainly recognized the need to balance stability with flexibility, since they provided for multiple avenues of constitutional change.
The Bess standard fails to strike that balance. It fails to consider that forcing too much needed constitutional change into the
constitutional convention process either paralyzes the constitution
or compels a risky and unpredictable constitutional convention.
Under Bess, if the citizens of Alaska desire a particular constitutional change (such as the various proposed subsistence amend153
ments ) they may have no alternative but to call a constitutional
convention. Once a convention is called, however, it has “plenary
154
Accordingly, once called, a
power” to revise the constitution.
constitutional convention cannot be controlled and risks introducing far more instability into Alaska’s constitutional system. The
150. Id. at 983 (“One purpose of requiring a constitutional convention for revisions of the constitution is to promote stability.”).
151. Id.
152. Kenneth P. Miller, Constraining Populism: The Real Challenge of Initiative
Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037, 1051 (2001).
153. See infra Part V.
154. ALASKA CONST. art. XIII, § 4.
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choice between stasis and a constitutional convention is one Alaskans should not be forced to make.
The second justification offered by the Bess court was the theory that constitutional conventions are somehow better equipped
155
than legislatures to consider changes to the state’s organic law.
The court reasoned that legislatures might not have the time to
properly consider all the ramifications of a constitutional revi156
sion, and, more importantly, that legislatures will be “a mirror of
political passions and interests, and, with the best intentions, can157
not be expected to be free from bias.” The court endorsed Judge
Jameson’s hope that “when a Convention is called, it is sometimes
158
possible to secure the return of” unbiased delegates.
This assumption, of course, does not square with contemporary political reality. Constitutional convention delegates are
highly unlikely to be chosen through some Platonic test that measures the ability to comprehend and revise constitutions. Rather,
delegates will likely be proposed by local and statewide political
organizations and selected by votes that follow party lines or other
political, ethnic, or ideological factions. As a result, convention
delegates will likely reflect the preferences and biases of the prevailing parties (and therefore of the legislature). Creating a hermetically sealed convention would be practically impossible.
Moreover, the more one moves away from a convention that
reflects prevailing political divisions, the more one risks diminishing the capacity of the delegates. At the opposite extreme, for example, randomly picking delegates out of the phone book has a
high chance of selecting a group of delegates remarkably ill-suited
to reading the existing constitution and drafting revisions.
The third, and by far the strongest, justification offered in Bess
159
was a concern about a bundling effect. The court cited a California case which expressed concern that multifarious amendments
might “aggregate[] for the measure the favorable votes from electors of many suasions who, wanting strongly enough any one or
more propositions offered, might grasp at that which they want,
160
Essentially, the Bess court
tacitly accepting the remainder.”
feared that allowing the legislature to propose complex, multifarious amendments would create a situation in which voters might ac155. Bess, 985 P.2d at 983.
156. Id. (“Legislatures will usually have their time taken up with other matters
and be unable to devote sufficient time to [the] subject.”).
157. Id. at 984 (citing JAMESON, supra note 36, § 539).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 985.
160. Id. (quoting McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 797 (Cal. 1948)).
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cept a package of changes because they wanted one part, without
adequately considering the import of other parts of the revision.
This concern does not support the broad lines drawn by Bess.
It could be addressed by a simple “no multifariousness” rule, and
at significantly less cost. If, for example, the court were to require
that proposed amendments be of a single subject, then the voters
would have an opportunity to vote for or against each individual
issue, thereby preventing the aggregation of multiple minorities
who each support distinct portions of a proposed amendment from
161
creating a false majority.
C. Bess’s Standard is Unclear and Confusing
It is necessary that the law regarding constitutional amendments and revisions be clear. The legislature must know, in advance, the limits of its constitutional powers. Likewise, courts reviewing proposed amendments need to know what the rules are.
As the facts in Bess demonstrate, there is often not much time for
courts to consider these issues and return possible amendments
back to the legislature. Moreover, as happened in Bess, the time
constraints associated with the electoral process may lead to adjudication based on minimal or nonexistent briefing. Accordingly,
any standard applied should be as clear and crisp as possible, providing forewarning to all parties concerned. Bess falls well short of
this standard.
The Bess court’s deviation from the California test created
considerable confusion. While the California test requires the
qualitative/quantitative violation to appear on the face of the challenged measure, the Bess court indicated that Alaska courts should
take a “hybrid” approach and look beyond the obvious and imme162
In its quantitative/qualitative asdiate impact of the measure.
sessment of Legislative Resolve No. 59 (the prisoners’ rights measure), the court remarked on the similarities between it and the
163
The court partially
initiative measure before the Raven court.
distinguished the Raven analysis, noting:
The Raven court held that the proposal constituted a qualitatively revisory change to the constitution, but not a quantitatively revisory change. We take a hybrid approach. Not only
would the proposal, for the reasons stated in Raven, “substantially alter the substance and integrity of the [California] Constitution as a document of independent force and effect,” but as we
held in the Preliminary Opinion and Order, it also would poten-

161. See infra Part V.B.
162. Bess, 985 P.2d at 988 (referring to the “hybrid test”).
163. Id. at 987-88.
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tially alter as many as eleven separate sections of [the California]
164
Constitution.

In adopting its “hybrid” approach, the court took a test that
had proved to be a reasonably workable standard, limited in subjectivity and appropriate to its purpose in assessing initiative measures, and transformed it into an almost entirely subjective analysis,
requiring speculation and guesswork, so striking in ambiguity that
it is decipherable only by the courts. The practical effect of this
vague “hybrid” approach is to subject Alaskans’ constitutional
amending powers (as effected by the legislature) to constant review
by the courts.
It is somewhat unclear whether the Bess court intended further departure from the California test by combining the qualitative/quantitative elements into a single, sliding-scale type analy165
In its assessment of Legislative Resolve No. 74 (the
sis.
reapportionment provision), the court observed that because the
quantitative effects are minimal, “the qualitative force of this nar166
row change would have to be greater to satisfy our hybrid test.”
As Justice Compton noted in his dissent, the California analysis
“does not test by comparing quantitative and qualitative criteria;
each stands on its own merits. A proposed enactment could satisfy
167
neither test, either test, or both tests.” Unfortunately, the court
did not develop further this sliding scale reference (as well as many
other aspects of the “hybrid” test), leaving decidedly important
questions entirely unresolved.
***
In sum, the legal reasoning in Bess left much to be desired.
The Bess court imported a test from California without changing it
to account for the unique structure of the Alaska Constitution. As
a result, while Californians can revise their constitution easily

164. Id. (quoting Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1087 (Cal. 1990)).
165. Justice Compton, in dissent, wrote:
The court uses the term “hybrid” again with respect to Legislative Resolve No. 74. It concludes that although reassignment of the power to
reapportion the legislature is “significant,” it does not constitute a revision since it does not deprive the executive branch of a “foundational
power.” The court reasons: “as the quantitative effect of a proposal is
minimal, the qualitative force of this narrow change would have to be
greater to satisfy our hybrid test.” The court still has not articulated just
what its “hybrid test” is, although it sounds suspiciously like a sliding
comparative scale test of some sort.
Id. at 989-90 (Compton, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 988.
167. Id. at 990 (Compton, J., dissenting in part).

DONLEY_FINAL(2).DOC

324

03/26/03 3:31 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[19:2

through the legislative process and are not forced into the stasis/constitutional convention choice, Alaskans are trapped by Bess.
None of the policy rationales articulated in Bess justify this radical
abridgement of the legislature’s constitutional role. Finally, regardless of the precedential or policy wisdom of the Bess opinion,
the test itself is incomprehensible, and does not allow the legislature to conscientiously discharge its duty to consider the constitutionality of proposed measures.
V. THE BESS RULE BARS RECENTLY PROPOSED
SUBSISTENCE AMENDMENTS
At the Twenty-first Legislature, Governor Tony Knowles proposed to amend the Alaska Constitution by adding the following
section to article VIII:
Section 19. SUBSISTENCE PRIORITY. The legislature may,
consistent with the sustained yield principle, provide a priority to
and among rural residents for the taking of fish and wildlife and
168
other renewable natural resources for subsistence.

The purpose of the proposed amendment was to bring the state
into compliance with the Alaska National Interest Lands Conser169
vation Act and allegedly allow state management of fish and
170
wildlife throughout the state. There have been many other subsistence amendments discussed along roughly the same lines.
The various proposed subsistence amendments are clearly not
171
amendatory changes, but rather are revisions under Bess. They
potentially alter or modify thirteen separate sections of the consti172
Through creation of an arbitrary and meritless distinctution.
tion, the amendments rob non-Natives of rights that the Alaska
173
Supreme Court has repeatedly called “highly important.” Fur-

168. H.J.R. 37, proposed, 21st Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1999).
169. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3101-33 (2000)).
170. H.J.R. 37, proposed, 21st Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1999).
171. This is certainly true of the various subsistence amendments recently proposed. It is possible that some variety of very limited local preference might be
proposed in the future that would not fall victim to this critique. We express no
opinion as to such an amendment.
172. See infra Part V.B. for a discussion of the effect of proposed subsistence
amendments.
173. McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 10 (Alaska 1989); Owsichek v. State Guide
Licensing, 763 P.2d 488, 492 n.10 (Alaska 1988); Ostrosky v. State, 667 P.2d 1184,
1196 (Alaska 1983) (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting). In Ostrosky, Justice Rabinowitz
stated the right to access natural resources is “a highly important right running to
each person in the state.” 667 P.2d at 1196 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting). The deci-
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ther, they purport to do what the Framers of the constitution expressly prohibited—assign special rights and privileges of access to
Alaska’s natural resources.
To understand how profoundly any proposed subsistence
“amendment” will impact the constitution, and thus how they
would violate Bess, it is useful to explore the historical foundations
on which the constitution was constructed, as well as the constitution’s integral role in everyday life in Alaska. Accordingly, Section
A of this Part will explore the history underlying the sections of the
Alaska Constitution impacted by the proposed subsistence
amendment, while Section B will discuss the effect of a subsistence
amendment, showing that it violates the Bess test.
A. The History of the Alaska Constitution
The Alaska Constitution was drafted by delegates of the Constitutional Convention of 1955-56 with the goal of creating a basic
legal framework that would reflect political maturity and readiness
174
for admission to statehood. The delegates had the benefit of almost two hundred years of constitutional interpretation, the advice
of nationally renowned constitutional experts, and the lessons and
175
models of the constitutional reform movement of the 1930s. The
result of the Fairbanks convention was a document tailored to account for the unique geographic and demographic features of the
state at the time. As one scholar wrote:
The Alaska Constitution is the product of a rugged, frontier
community; yet its content fits a modern day, complex, industrial
society. It combines the experience of other states with contemporary ideas on constitution making, tradition with innovation,
and the classical with the modern. While certain of its provisions
are peculiar to the special situations in Alaska, this basic law
may well serve as a model for constitutional revision in older
states. Perhaps the Alaska Constitution has most nearly ap176
proximated the ideal.

While the Alaska model draws heavily from the federal Bill of
Rights, it is by no means a carbon copy. The Framers included
177
several provisions not addressed by the U.S. Constitution, insions in Owsichek and McDowell also adopted this sentiment. See Owsichek, 763
P.2d at 492; McDowell, 785 P.2d at 10.
174. See Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the “Last Frontier,” Professor Gardner:
Alaska’s Independent Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 12 ALASKA
L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1995).
175. Id. at 7.
176. P. Allan Dionisopoulos, Indiana 1851, Alaska, 1956; A Century of Difference in State Constitutions, 34 IND. L.J. 34, 54 (1958).
177. Nelson, supra note 174, at 7-8 n.34.
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cluding the right to equal opportunities,178 the right to receive fair
179
180
and just treatment in legislative investigations, bail rights, pro181
182
tection from debtors’ prison, education, and administration of
183
natural resources. That many of the aforementioned provisions
are absent from the U.S. Constitution and other state constitutions
only highlights their importance in the Framers’ vision of Alaska’s
basic law.
Article VIII, devoted exclusively to natural resources, is perhaps the hallmark of the Alaska Constitution. Its likeness appears
nowhere in any other constitution in the United States. It embodies the significance of fish, minerals, and wildlife in Alaskan society
and the expectation that they would continue to be important in
184
the future. Language was carefully chosen with the goals of not
restricting future generations and fixing these philosophical concepts so firmly in the law and consciousness of Alaskans that they
185
could not be subverted by stealth, ineptitude, or inattention.
Intricately woven into the text of article VIII are the concepts
186
of broad public access and sustained yield. Sections I, II, III, IV
and XV are particularly illustrative of the Framers’ intent:
Section I. STATEMENT OF POLICY. It is the policy of the
State to encourage the settlement of its land and the development of its resources by making them available for maximum use
consistent with the public interest.
Section II. GENERAL AUTHORITY. The legislature shall
provide for the utilization, development, and conservation of all
natural resources belonging to the State, including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people.
Section III. COMMON USE. Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for
common use.
Section IV. SUSTAINED YIELD. Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands, and all other replenishable resources belonging to the
State shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the sustained yield principle, subject to preference among beneficial
uses.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.
Id. art. I, § 7.
Id. art. I, § 11.
Id. art. I, § 17.
Id. art. VII, §§ 1-3.
Id. art. VIII.
GORDON S. HARRISON, ALASKA LEGIS. RESEARCH AGENCY, ALASKA’S
CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 149 (3d ed. 1992).
185. Id.
186. See generally ALASKA CONST. art. VIII.
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Section XV. NO EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF FISHERY. No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or
authorized in the natural waters of the State. This section does
not restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery
for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a
livelihood and to promote the efficient development of aquacul187
ture in the State.

Through article VIII, the Alaska Constitution embodies historic
“public trust” principles of water resource and wildlife manage188
In speaking of “ancient tradition in property rights,” it
ment.
recognized that title to uncaptured wildlife “is reserved to the peo189
ple or the state on behalf of the people.” The Alaska Supreme
Court noted that the Framers relied heavily on Greer v. Connecti190
cut, the seminal case on the “public trust” doctrine, in drafting ar191
The
ticle VIII (particularly section 3’s “common use” clause).
Greer court noted that the state’s power over wildlife “is to be exercised, like all other powers of the government, as a trust for the
benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for the advantage of
the government, as distinct from the people, or for the benefit of
192
private individuals as distinguished from the public good.”
The expression “for common use” implies that these resources
are not to be subject to exclusive grants or special privilege as was
193
so frequently the case in ancient royal tradition. A memorandum
of the Constitutional Convention Committee on Resources further
emphasizes the Framers’ intent to reproduce the principles outlined in Greer: “This section is intended to exclude any especially
privileged status for any person in the use of natural resources
194
subject to the disposition of the state.”
B. The Effect of the Subsistence Amendment
The subsistence amendment as proposed by Governor
Knowles in the 1998 special session proposes to assign special ac187. Id. art. VIII, §§ 1-4, 15.
188. Stephen M. White, “Equal Access” To Alaska’s Fish And Wildlife, 11
ALASKA L. REV. 277, 278 (1994).
189. Id. at 279 n.8.
190. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332
(1979).
191. Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska 1988).
192. Greer, 161 U.S. at 529.
193. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 493 (citing Committee on Resources, Terms, Alaska
Constitutional Convention Papers, Folder 210).
194. 6 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention 84 (Dec. 16, 1955),
quoted in McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 6 (Alaska 1989).
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cess to natural resources for subsistence purposes to rural residents
of Alaska. This is not an issue unfamiliar to Alaska courts. Over
the past two decades, the courts have considered numerous challenges to access restrictions. In keeping with the historical and current import of natural resources in Alaska and the Framers’ intentions, many decisions closely scrutinized any infringement on
article VIII rights.
In determining the qualitative and quantitative impact of the
proposed subsistence amendment, it is useful to track judicial interpretation of article VIII. The significance of article VIII (in particular, the common use clause) was first voiced in Justice Rabi195
nowitz’s dissent in State v. Ostrosky: “Since the right of common
use is guaranteed expressly by the constitution, it must be viewed
as a highly important interest running to each person within the
196
state.” The court was assessing the constitutionality of the Lim197
ited Entry Act, which restricted anyone from becoming a primary
198
operator of commercial fishing gear without an entry permit.
The permits, unlimited in duration, were restricted in quantity and
the original “grantees” had the power to assign, sell, or pass on to
199
heirs their right to the gear fishery resource. Justice Rabinowitz
would have held that the statute violated article VIII, section 3 and
200
section 15, as well as article I, section 1. He further indicated that
the state carried a high burden of showing the substantiality of its
interests when infringing on the right to common use of natural re201
sources under equal protection analysis.
Equal protection analysis is most commonly associated with
rights contained in article I. However, Justice Rabinowitz would
have held that the rights associated with article VIII were important enough to merit application of the equal protection “sliding
202
scale” test. As mentioned above, the rights infringed were a

195. 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983).
196. Id. at 1196.
197. ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.43.010-.380 (Michie 2000).
198. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1188.
199. ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.43.120(b), 16.43.150(h) (Michie 2000).
200. See Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1195-98 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 1196 & n.3 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1198 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting). The “sliding-scale” test is a tool of
constitutional analysis unique to Alaska wherein the importance of the right infringed is assessed against the importance of the state interest. The more important the right, the higher the burden shouldered by the state to prove a pressing
and substantial interest, as well as use of the least intrusive/impairing means. Id.
at 1193.
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“highly important interest running to each person in the state.”203
Consequently, the state had to show that it had a significant interest that was substantially furthered by infringing the rights in article VIII. Justice Rabinowitz concluded that the provisions of the
Limited Entry Act were not the least intrusive means of accom204
The statute, according to the displishing the state’s objective.
205
sent, was therefore unconstitutional.
The dissent in Ostrosky was subsequently adopted by the court
206
in State v. Owsichek, an action challenging the constitutionality of
207
exclusive guiding areas. The court in Owsichek, however, more
thoroughly explored the range of permissible regulations and/or
208
entry restrictions under the “common use clause.” While acknowledging that the clause does not preclude the legislature from
limiting or restricting access, the court reiterated the state’s duty to
209
apply the least intrusive means of accomplishing its objective. In
the court’s words:
In State v. Ostrosky, we noted that there is a tension between the
limited entry clause of the state constitution and the clauses of
the constitution which guaranty open fisheries. We suggested
that to be constitutional, a limited entry system should impinge
as little as possible on the open fishery clauses consistent with the
constitutional purposes of limited entry, namely, prevention of
210
economic distress to fishermen and resource conservation.

The court continued:
In light of this historical review we conclude that the common
use clause was intended to engraft in our constitution certain
trust principles guaranteeing access to the fish, wildlife and water
203. Id. at 1196 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 1195 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
205. See id. at 1195-98 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
206. 763 P.2d 488, 492 n.10 (Alaska 1988).
207. Id. at 488.
208. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 492. The court stated:
This court has never considered these questions before. However, in
four cases, we have indicated an intent to apply the common use clause
in a way that strongly protects public access to natural resources. First,
with respect to article VIII generally, we have written, “A careful reading of the constitutional minutes established that the provisions in article VIII were intended to permit the broadest possible access to and use
of state waters by the general public.” Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d 1191,
1198-99 (Alaska 1973). Given the text of the common use clause, the
same policy should apply to wildlife as well.
Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 492 (footnote omitted).
209. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 495.
210. Id. at 492 (quoting Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 758 P.2d
1256, 1266 (Alaska 1988)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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resources of the state. The proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention, together with the common law tradition on which
the delegates built, convince us that a minimum requirement of
this duty is a prohibition against any monopolistic grants or special privileges. Accordingly, we are compelled to strike down
211
any statutes or regulations that violate this principle.

Less than one year after the Owsichek decision, the court
handed down another seminal decision interpreting the provisions
212
of article VIII. In McDowell v. State, the court examined the
same type of discrimination contemplated by the proposed subsistence amendment. At issue was a 1986 statute imposing a subsis213
The court emphatitence preference based on rural residency.
cally labeled it unconstitutional, finding the classification methods
214
“crude” and both under- and over-inclusive. The court summa215
rized the principles outlined in previous decisions:
Most recently in Owsichek, we suggested that section 17 of article VIII, the uniform application clause, “may require ‘more
stringent review’ of a statute than does the equal protection
clause in cases involving natural resources.” . . . We also cited
with approval Justice Rabinowitz’s dissent in Ostrosky, which
employs a least restrictive alternative approach in view of the
“highly important interest running to each person within the
state” by virtue of the common use clause.
In reviewing legislation which burdens the equal access clauses
of article VIII, the purpose of the burden must be at least important. The means used to accomplish the purpose must be designed for the216least possible infringement on article VIII’s open
access values.

The court suggested that “a classification scheme employing
individual characteristics would be less invasive of the article VIII
open access values and much more apt to accomplish the purpose

211. Id. at 496.
212. 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989).
213. Id. at 1. Subsistence fishing and hunting are defined as activities that can
be undertaken only “by a resident domiciled in a rural area of the state . . . .”
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.940 (Michie 2000). “Subsistence uses” were defined as
non-commercial, customary and traditional uses of wild, renewable resources by a
resident domiciled in a rural area of the state for direct personal or family consumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing, tools, or transportation, for the making
and selling of handicraft articles out of non-edible by-products of fish and wildlife
resources taken for personal or family consumption, and for the customary trade,
barter, or sharing for personal or family consumption. Id.
214. McDowell, 785 P.2d at 10-11.
215. Id. at 10. The court relied primarily on Justice Rabinowitz’ dissent in
Ostrosky and the majority in Owsichek.
216. Id. (citations omitted).
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of the statute than the urban-rural criterion.”217 The equal access
clauses of article VIII, wrote Justice Matthews, are a special type of
equal protection guarantee and bar the residential discrimination
218
imposed by the impugned statute.
Justice Moore wrote a concurring opinion in which he subjected the impugned statute to equal protection analysis under article I, section 1. He quickly concluded that the statute’s classification scheme for deciding who is entitled to engage in subsistence
hunting and fishing was not closely related to the purpose of the
Act:
As the court’s opinion describes, large numbers of residents of
areas classified as urban under the Act are dependent upon subsistence hunting and fishing. Conversely, some of the state’s
larger cities where many people are not dependent upon subsistence hunting and fishing, are classified as rural . . . . The fit between the Act and the state’s interest does not even approach that
required to withstand close scrutiny. Therefore, the Act violates
the equal protection and uniform application clauses of the
219
Alaska Constitution.

The McDowell decision represents the most profound and exhaustive discussion of the meaning of article VIII and its relationship to other sections of the constitution. The very type of discrimination contemplated by Governor Knowles’ proposed
subsistence amendment is examined and rejected as contrary to the
values and goals of Alaska’s constitution. The addition of section
19 would change the course of constitutional interpretation of
equal protection clauses in both article I and article VIII.
***
It is evident from the court’s treatment of cases involving access restrictions to natural resources that article VIII is viewed as a
fundamentally important subset of equality rights. Unlike other
states where similar issues are subsumed under the more general
equal protection clauses, Alaska affords independent protection of
natural resource access rights. The courts have recognized the significance of the Framers’ unique provisions with respect to natural
resources and accorded appropriate respect to their intentions in
Ostrosky, Owsichek, and McDowell.
Governor Knowles’ proposed subsistence amendment conflicts with the historic principles embodied in Alaska’s constitution.
Changing the constitution to allow the state to discriminate on the

217. Id. at 11.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
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grounds of place of residence blatantly disregards the Framers’
goals of broad public access, equal protection under the law, and
equal, not special, rights or privileges with respect to natural resources. Such a monumental shift in policy cannot legally be
achieved through the process of amendment. If the legislature
wishes to reverse the philosophical basis of the constitution, it must
subject the proposal to the more rigorous, exacting and independent scrutiny of a constitutional convention.
Moreover, Bess’s reach does not stop at the proposed subsistence amendment. The Alaska Constitution has been amended
many times since it was drafted. Without question, some of these
amendments are likely “revisions,” no matter how the court ulti220
mately ciphers its “hybrid” test. Thus, in addition to confounding
any effort to place a subsistence amendment on the ballot, Bess
retroactively draws into question the legality of many sections of
the Alaska Constitution. How will the court respond when a disgruntled citizen sues, claiming he was deprived of rights by the ultra vires adoption of a legislatively proposed revision to the constitution?
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE BESS TEST
It is important that the Alaska Supreme Court establish a test
that: (1) does not excessively restrict the legislature’s ability to propose necessary constitutional changes; (2) gives substantive meaning to the amendment/revision distinction in the Alaska Constitution; and (3) is tailored to fit the unique structure of the Alaskan
constitutional scheme.
Greater scope for change must be allowed under an amendatory process carried out by the legislature. The very nature of the
legislative process demands deliberation, consensus-building, and
221
The super-majority requirement of a two-thirds
compromise.
vote in both houses means that amendment measures cannot ignore segments of society—the needs of all Alaskans must be taken
into account to build necessary support for any given proposal.
Consensus-building and compromise are not confined to those
seated in the two chambers of the legislature. In today’s informa-

220. For example, in 1981 the legislature proposed, and the voters ratified, an
amendment that established a complex limitation on appropriations in Alaska. It
substantially affected many provisions of the Alaska constitution, including articles II, IX, and XV. Other potentially vulnerable amendments include the limited
entry amendment, the permanent fund amendment, the resident preferences
amendment, and the crime victims’ rights amendment.
221. Miller, supra note 152, at 1051.

DONLEY_FINAL(2).DOC

2002]

AMENDMENTS VERSUS REVISIONS

03/26/03 3:31 PM

333

tion age, the legislative process is more accessible than ever. There
are virtually no barriers to prevent the public from providing input
at the drafting and framing stage. Unlike initiative measures, legislatively proposed amendments can be altered prior to placement
on the ballot in response to the public’s concerns. In short, the
legislative process accomplishes the same goals of open debate,
compromise, qualitative majorities, and respect for minority rights
as a constitutional convention—merely on a smaller, less expensive, and more convenient scale.
Thus, any test adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court for distinguishing between amendment and revision of the constitution
must acknowledge that the legislature plays this role. A convention provides reassuring elements of independence and a particular
focus that is exceptionally valuable when contemplating a substantial overhaul of the constitution. However, for constitutional
changes necessary to the efficient function of the state, and to meet
the ever-increasing and diverse needs of Alaskans, the legislature
should be less impeded in its law-making powers.
Section A of this Part will propose and describe an alternative
hybrid test superior to that adopted in Bess. Section B will propose
and defend the use of a single-subject test in place of the Bess test.
Either or both of these alternatives would better suit the needs of
Alaskans.
A. An Alternative Hybrid Test
The Alaska Supreme Court should adopt a test similar in
structure to the California two-part test, but which incorporates a
much broader concept of the term “amendment.” It must be
clearly distinguished from the California test and be informed by
Alaska’s history, constitutional structure, and governmental needs.
In inquiring whether a proposed measure falls within the scope of
an allowable amendment, the court should ask the following:
(1) Quantitative Inquiry. Does the measure on its face
substantially alter the fundamental structure of the constitution by deleting, amending, or repealing existing language or adding numerous articles or sections? If the answer is “yes,” the measure is a revision. This is an inquiry
into the direct impact of the measure on the text of the
constitution. Unlike the “hybrid” test in Bess, this analysis should exclude subjective assessment of potential indirect impacts of the measure on other sections of the constitution. Furthermore, the quantitative effects test would
be exceeded only if the measure attempts to substantially
change a significant percentage of the existing provisions
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of the constitution (or significantly increases the size of
the existing constitution).
(2) Qualitative Inquiry. Does the measure derogate from,
reallocate, reassign, or create rights in any of the constituent branches of government such that the fundamental
framework of government envisioned by the Framers is
substantially altered? Does the measure substantially
derogate from fundamental civil rights assigned to the
people of Alaska by the Framers of the constitution? If
the answer to either question is “yes,” the measure is a revision.
Such a test would have several advantages over the Bess test.
Not only would it be simpler for legislatures and courts to under222
stand, it would also avoid the ripeness problem created in Bess,
by asking courts only to read the face of the amendment and consider its immediate textual implications.
The Bess opinion requires courts to rule on the constitutionality of an amendment proposal by guessing at the amendment’s effect. Constitutional amendments, like all laws, gain their meaning
by their application to specific facts. Yet the Bess decision requires
future courts to anticipate, without the benefit of a factual context,
the meaning and effect a constitutional amendment will have to determine if the amendment might reach too far and become a revision. Courts generally recognize that it is imprudent to decide issues not actually raised on the specific facts before the court. Law
is only meaningful as applied to facts, and the presentation of different facts can significantly change a court’s analysis of law. The
meaning of a constitutional amendment, for example, is highly dependent on its interpretation by courts. The “case or controversy”
223
clause in Article III of the U.S. Constitution, for example, could
be read as permitting federal courts to render advisory opinions. A
“case” would be the sort of adversarial proceeding courts are accustomed to dealing with, featuring opposing parties with standing;
while a “controversy” would be an inchoate legal issue, the merits
of which have been referred to the court. However, as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court, “case or controversy” collapses essentially into “case,” and advisory opinions are not permit224
ted.

222. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
223. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
224. See, e.g., Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408 (1792) (advisory opinions impermissible).
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The Bess test, however, does not account for this problem.
The qualitative test requires courts to decide how big an impact a
constitutional provision will have. Yet a court cannot do that without interpreting the amendment. Likewise, the quantitative test
requires courts to decide how many other provisions of the constitution an amendment will affect. Yet a court cannot do that, either, without interpreting the amendment. Thus, to apply both
tests, a court confronted with a potential amendment must interpret the amendment and define its meaning—with no factual context or basis.
Second, the revised test would capture the significance of
structural changes to the division of governmental powers in a way
that the Bess test does not. The Bess test emphasizes form over
substance. The Bess court quoted with approval a California case
225
that emphasized the number of words in a proposed amendment,
while also quoting with approval a scholar who suggests that “a
new distribution among the agencies of government of their constitutional powers” is insignificant enough to qualify as an amend226
This reflects a serious mis-emphasis. At best, a word
ment.
count can suggest that an amendment goes too far; by contrast, the
structural division of powers amongst branches of government is
palpably one of the most important functions of a constitution.
The Bess opinion expressly discounts the significance of structural changes. For example, it quotes Judge Jameson as saying that
a proper subject for amendment is “a new distribution among the
227
agencies of government of their constitutional powers.” Moreover, the court held that Legislative Resolve No. 74 was an amend228
ment rather than a revision. Number 74, however, removed from
the executive the power of reapportionment and vested it in a neutral body, which is a structural reapportionment of power. Accordingly, by both its dicta and holding, Bess seems to suggest that
structural revisions to the distribution of powers among Alaska’s
coordinate branches can be accomplished by amendment.
Yet structural changes can hardly be of “comparatively small
229
importance.” One of the most important functions of a constitution is to apportion the power delegated by the people to government. The Framers of the federal constitution certainly thought so.
Many, in fact, felt a Bill of Rights was wholly redundant. Individ225. Bess, 985 P.2d at 985 (quoting with approval McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d
787, 788 (1948)).
226. Id. at 983 (quoting JAMESON, supra note 36, § 540, at 562).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 989 (Compton, J., dissenting in part).
229. Id. at 987.
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ual liberties were already protected by implication once the powers
were separated and assigned between state and federal governments and between the various branches of the federal govern230
ment.
California courts hold the view that structural changes are revisory in nature. The court in Amador Valley, for example, held
that a proposal that achieved “far-reaching changes in the nature of
231
Furthermore,
our basic governmental plan” would be revisory.
the court in Raven struck as revisory a proposed measure limiting
criminal defense rights to those guaranteed under the federal constitution because it vested all judicial interpretive power in relation
232
to criminal defense rights in the United States Supreme Court.
The measure thus derogated substantially the essential powers assigned by the California Constitution to a branch of government
233
(the judiciary). The California test, even as reported in Bess, focuses on “far reaching changes in the nature of our basic govern234
mental plan.” Unfortunately, while incorporating the text of the
California tests, the Bess court lost sight of its focus and reasoning.
Instead of emphasizing the importance of structural changes,
Bess draws the line between amendment and revision, not in a way
that is sensitive to protecting the structure created by the Alaska
constitution, but rather in a way that focuses on word and section
counts. Under Bess, a measure can be struck as revisory merely
because it has too many words, while another can pass as amendatory, even if it tampers with the distribution of powers among the
coordinate branches. Whatever the Framers did intend by the
amendment/revision distinction, this certainly was not it.
B. A Single Subject/No Multifariousness Test
We also suggest that the court require that amendment propositions embrace only one subject. This rule would help defend
against corruption of the amendment process through logrolling
and voter confusion and/or deception. The single-subject test
should be very liberally construed, however, in recognition of the
230. E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (“For why declare that things shall not be
done which there is no power to do? . . . The constitution is itself, in every rational
sense, . . . A BILL OF RIGHTS . . . . Is it one object of a bill of rights to declare
and specify the political privileges of the citizens in the structure and administration of the government?”).
231. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286
(Cal. 1978).
232. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1087 (Cal. 1990).
233. Id.
234. Bess, 985 P.2d at 987 (quoting Amador Valley, 583 P.2d at 1286).
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need to prevent undue restraint of the legislature’s amending powers. Echoing the California courts’ historical interpretation of the
single-subject test, the provisions of a proposed amendment measure need merely be reasonably germane to the overarching purpose of the measure.
The single-subject test would be superior to the Bess test for
several reasons. Most importantly, it fully satisfies all concerns
235
about logrolling and bundling. It does so, in fact, better than the
Bess test does. For example, the Bess test would not capture an
amendment that couples two unrelated, yet quantitatively and
qualitatively small measures together. Additionally, the singlesubject test focuses attention on content rather than form. Under
the Bess test, an amendment might fail if it touches a large number
of constitutional provisions, regardless of the actual substantive
scope of the amendment. This emphasis on provision counts
merely invites confusion and complicated litigation, as the subsis236
tence example discussed above demonstrates.
Finally, the single-subject test is vastly simpler and easier to
apply than the Bess test. As a result, the legislature will understand—before litigation, not after—whether a proposed constitutional amendment is legitimate. Moreover, courts will be able to
adjudicate such cases on a principled basis, rather than making a
subjective guess as to the qualitative and quantitative importance
of a proposal.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Bess decision saddled Alaska with a legal framework that
does not fit Alaska’s history or constitutional structure. Asked to
interpret article XII on an expedited basis, the court leaned too
heavily on California’s jurisprudence, and did not consider the significant differences between California’s methods of constitutional
change and Alaska’s. Moreover, perhaps due to the haste with
which the issue was resolved, the court crafted a test that is unpredictable and unworkable, discounting important factors and overemphasizing trivial ones.
The court should take the earliest opportunity either to replace or at least clarify Bess. In general, the court should be guided
by an appreciation of the distinct differences between the proposal
of an amendment by popular initiative and proposal by a deliberative legislative body. The court should also be sensitive to the fact
that Alaskans have only two options for constitutional change; leg235. See supra Part III.B.
236. See supra Part IV.
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islatively proposed amendments or a dangerous and uncontrollable
constitutional convention. Accordingly, the court should craft a
new test or change its current test in a way that gives the legislature
more freedom to propose changes to the Alaska Constitution. Until it does so, various changes contemplated by the people of
Alaska, most notably recently proposed subsistence amendments,
will be blocked—not by the Alaska electorate, but rather by the
Alaska Supreme Court.

